The 1916 fixation had caught me and stunted my mental growth, so that even ten years later I was retarded and adolescent. I could not escape from the comradeship of the trenches which had become a mental internment camp.... At last the long convalescence ended with the breaking of a barrier. The inhibition was released in the years 1929-1931 when society was brought to its senses by the shock of the great economic depression. ... In this disillusioned nineteen-thirties the ex-soldiers at last could speak and out came tumbling the flood of wartime reminiscences in every country which had sent soldiers to the war.5
Traumatic memories differ from normal memories. The traumatic memory recurs involuntarily against the wishes of the rememberer, in contrast to our studied efforts to remember what we have forgotten or dreaming reverie. In the traumatic memory the past defines and determines the present actions and thinking of the rememberer, whereas in normal remembering the needs of the present determine what is called up associationally from the past.
Erik Erikson came to the conclusion that the cases of war neurosis he dealt with in the South Pacific during the second world war were rooted in a discontinuity caused by combat. In the war some had lost their identity -'the ability to experience oneself as something that has continuity and sameness '.6 Look at this with another eye and it appears that many psychic victims of military events suffer from continuity, not discontinuity. They cannot separate themselves, as others do, from those events negating the characteristic continuousness of a living being. Their problem is an inability to establish the discontinuity creative of a 'past', the place where westerners put their finished matters, so that they may be taken out and used when needed as cautions, examples, models. What erodes the ability to forget war? What removes the characteristically human capacity to set aside the most recent disaster and dwell upon a happier past? John Locke suggested that an invisible force like gravity may be perceived and measured through the changes it makes in the substance upon which it acts. We might gauge the power of industrial war in terms of the changes it makes in the minds of those who have endured it, in terms of how it distinguishes the abnormal from the normal, of how it erodes in some the ability to forget and repress a near-death experience, distinguishing them from those who survive intact, who 'soon forget their haunted nights, their cowed subjection to the ghosts of friends who died, their dreams that drip with murder; and they'll be proud of glorious war, that shattered all their pride'.7
Forgetting is obviously essential to a proper remembering. 'In remembering we are being determined by events out of their precise order in a chronological series, and we are free from over-determination by the immediately preceding event.'8 But it is precisely forgetting that liberates us from the immediately preceding event, allows us to escape from the lock-step of the chronological series, from the one-way, one-damned-thing-after-another-ness of time. The repression of the immediate past liberates us from over-determination by it and makes time a two-way street, as we go back and select from the past the causes of our current condition. The ability to not know or accept what is experienced and witnessed, to repress what has just happened, is the source of our historical freedom, something which defines us as humans and makes human history characteristically dialectical, crooked and unpredictable. In this sense those deprived of the ability to forget have become creatures less free and human, more determined, predictable and instinctual.
The injunction to forget the experiences of war is a peculiar and defining feature of our twentieth-century industrial wars fought by citizen-soldiers in their millions. The professional soldiers, members of military societies, nations, castes, brotherhoods and classes who fought pre-industrial wars never ceased being soldiers when a war was over, returning to societies which provided a special, often honourable niche for them. Traditionally, successful warriors were enjoined to sing and boast of their killings or paid others to do it for them. This is a source of the richness of traditional war literature coming from a time when men killed each other without shame or guilt, without need or passion, solely for glory, honour, fame and recognition. The reason why forgetting is asked of men fighting our modern wars lies in the fact that they are fought by men who must change their identities, from civilian to soldier and back again. First the recruit must set aside for the duration his civilian life as a place of peace, women and comfort, a time when killing people was forbidden and punished as criminal. He must acquire in a few weeks or months techniques of repressing fear and guilt which professional armies instil in recruits over years. 'Those thus incompletely trained have had to face strains such as have never previously been known in the history of mankind. Small wonder that the failures of adaptation have been so numerous and severe.'9 Forgetting was also essential in the context of war, if it was to be endured. 'The successful soldier forgets unpleasant experiences very quickly; if he doesn't . . . he finds his way to hospital as a psychiatrist's case. Brave men experience fear . . . but they forget it, forget it again and again.'0 With the conclusion of a war the citizen-soldier needs to forget one more time, has to set aside his soldierhood and expunge the sites of his immanent death and survival from his mind. Because industrial societies define war as an abnormal state of emergency and presume that war and peace are distinct and separate realms of existence, those who adapt to these contexts are presumed to have changed identities, and are required to forget, again and again, or they end up in a psychiatric ward. This sequence of forgettings required of citizen-soldiers equips the survivors of war with a double past -a pre-war past and a wartime past -linked but incommensurate. This double past is the framework of postwar perceptions, the source of the dominant mood and voice of irony, scepticism and nonbelief, originally explored by Paul Fussell in his pathfinding study." With this double past all postwar judgments are made in the consciousness that what was once presumed true was made false and became an illusion, then that disillusioning reality of war itself became a superseded past, a discrete duration full of things no longer true or remembered.
Forgetting and remembering are the same process, different names for opposite sides of the sieve that sifts daily experience, separating it out into shortterm (the forgotten) and long-term (remembered) memory. Experimental psychologists and ancient practitioners of the memory arts learned certain home-truths about the process of forgetting and remembering. There is an order to forgetting. Tactile impressions -smells, sounds, visual detailsare forgotten first, images and words last. Repetition builds memory, nonrepetition does not. What is not repeated is quickly forgotten. As evidence of this, Bartlett observed that the subjects of his memory experiments remembered only the details they repeated of the stories they heard. There is much evidence that memory is not a reproduction of experience in mental images but a product of construction through repetition of images, words, communication.
We may learn how forgetting occurs collectively from the way the experience of the war was consciously forgotten in 1919 and throughout the 1920s. The events which had consumed the interest of Europeans, the whole world, for four years suddenly ceased to be publicly discussed. The war was denied words and forgotten. Robert Graves and Alan Hodge note that books and newspaper articles about the war became unfashionable with demobilization. The war was a forbidden subject between veterans and non-veterans.
I never mentioned the war to them. It seemed to me that the boys had had quite enough of it, and wouldn't want to talk about it. As a matter of fact they would have liked to talk about it, but were not able to. The scheme of things in which the war had taken an honorable place was destroyed. The ideas for which those who came home had suffered agoniesFatherland, Nation, National Honor -were out of date.l4 Charles Carrington (p. 87) implies that his rich remembering of the war was triggered by the depression that broke down the barriers of silence between former combatants and civilians who now, again, suffered a crisis together. Remarque's remembering of his inglorious war -three weeks at the front, over a year in a hospital -was generated by the need to explain a debilitating depression that struck him down in autumn 1928, confining him to his room and preventing him from working as an assistant editor of a sports magazine.
I suffered chronic attacks of anxiety and confusion. In order to overcome this I tried consciously and systematically to discover the cause of my depression. In this retrospective analysis I came back to my war experience. I could observe something similar in many acquaintances and friends: we all were -and are often still -restless, purposeless, sometimes exalted sometimes indifferent, but always, in the deepest sense, sad. The shadow of the war still hung over us even when we didn't think about it. The same day I had this thought I began to write.26
He wrote his novel in six weeks and diagnosed his problem. Note the sequence of Remarque's remembering of the war. First a pathology was felt, then a need to explain it. The war experience came to mind. It became the cause of Remarque's sadness, which he shared with his generation. His expressed sense of failure to become the writer he wanted to be could not be the result of any personal shortcoming, because it came from 'a secular apocalypse which had robbed not only him but his entire generation of the possibility of selfrealization '.27 This is the pattern in history generally. In history, causes come after effects and are deduced from consequences. Something has already to exist before its causes are needed; it has to be perceived as a problem before an explanation of it is required and looked for. In the depressed 1930s the war so quickly forgotten was needed as a source of causes for the collapse, a source of explanations, justifications and alternatives to a deflated capitalist system. The debates in literature over the nature of the war -as an experience of terror or community -recreated the war as an organized past which justified attitudes of pacifism and militarism, appeasement and aggression, through which the war was renewed in 1939, becoming the 'first' world war. In the course of the second world war the image of the first continued to function as a source of 'lessons' about what must be avoided at all costs, also as a frame of reference which participants constantly used to gauge the uniqueness of their own experience, its difference.
There is a consensus among all who observed, suffered, diagnosed and treated the symptoms of shell-shock and battle fatigue, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Gulf-War syndrome that these are conditions of chronic and persisting fear generated by particular contexts of war. The shaping and specifying of participants' fears of death and loss render the events of war contexts of mind containing memories that determine, cause and justify postwar funks and precautions.
This essential character of war neurosis as the outward and visible sign of an inner terror was clearly recognized and described by J.F.C. Fuller in his testimony before the British War Office Committee on Shell-Shock in 1921.
Leed: Industn'alized War and Traumatic Neuroses I have noticed that the normal, healthy man arriving from England showed definite signs of physical fear when first coming under fire. This fear very shortly wore off and was replaced by a type of callousness which sometimes increased until a man took very little trouble to protect himself. I noticed in several cases that when this condition was well advanced a man became liable to break down mentally, or to show a nervousness which may be defined rather as mental terror than a physical fear. What I noticed was that first of all the man was healthily afraid of what was happening then he became callous and after that he sometimes became obsessed with fear.28
Note that war neurosis is the product of a sequence of adaptations and responses to immobilized industrial warfare. At first, the courageous recruit is properly afraid of the shells. Then habituation sets in, the fear is repressed and the veteran grows 'fearless' and 'callous'. This is a military mask of masculinity designed to contain fear and to suppress emotions contravening endurance of war. In growing careless with his life and suppressing fear the recruit becomes 'tough', 'rugged', 'hard-bitten', 'cold' -the terms veterans used in praising each other. This repression of fear and demonstration of fearlessness translates healthy fear into terror, a fear of one's fear, an emotional state of inner dread, the precursor of nervous breakdown. As Freud put it, 'In the case of the war neurosis the thing feared is after all an inner foe.'29
Moralists, psychotherapists and medical officers unfriendly to psychoanalysis, military officers and soldiers themselves all agreed that war neurosis was an evolved structure of fear, though they used different terms -'courage' and 'cowardice' -to describe it. To many, shell-shock was the loss of courage -which Plato defined as the knowledge of what is rightly to be feared (the destruction of one's community). E. Macpather, a medical officer in France during the war, thought war neurosis was nothing but a new name for oldfashioned cowardice. 'Frankly I am not prepared to draw a distinction between cowardice and "shell-shock", cowardice I take to mean action under the influence of fear, and the ordinary kind of "shell-shock" to my mind was chronic and persisting fear.'30 Squadron Leader W. Tyrell thought that the victims themselves were not to blame for their loss of courage and that fatigue was a primary factor in reducing the energy available to repress fear, which a man must do to 'save his self-respect and self-esteem at all costs'.31 Soldiers themselves talked about their fears in terms of courage and cowardice. Men who thought of themselves as and were considered courageous were particularly disturbed by the symptoms of shell-shock: trembling hands, startled reactions, hyper-awareness, insomnia, nightmares. Robert Desaubliaux was particularly concerned when he felt this new kind of fear spreading from within him when he returned to the line three days after suffering concussion from a shell: 'But could I have lost my courage? Each shell gave me a chill and made
